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How the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Can 
Help Referee FIFA 
CATHERINE LEE†  
INTRODUCTION 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association, known as 
FIFA, states that it “has a zero-tolerance policy towards wrongdoing 
of any kind and is committed to the principles of good governance and 
transparency in all areas of its operations.”1  However, the organization 
has been plagued with allegations of world-wide criminal and civil 
trespasses for decades, gaining a reputation as “an international crime 
syndicate that occasionally organizes soccer matches.”2 In 2015 alone, 
41 individuals and entities involved with FIFA were arrested on 
corruption charges, including allegations of wire fraud, money 
laundering, and racketeering; twelve of those individuals and two 
sports marketing companies have already been convicted.3 
For the last half-century, international efforts have focused on 
increasing accountability of international organizations and businesses 
to reduce corruption,4 yet many countries’ laws do not regulate the 
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 1.  Governance: The Reform Process, F. . .D. . .RATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL 
ASS’N [FIFA], http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-works/the-reform-process.html (last 
visited May 27, 2016). 
 2.  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Episode 46 (HBO television broadcast July 26, 
2015). 
 3.  FIFA Crisis: US Charges 16 More Officials After Earlier Zurich Arrests, BBC SPORT 
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/34991874. 
 4.  Specifically the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Anti-
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actions of large-scale international sporting organizations, such as 
FIFA. For example, the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977 (FCPA),5 designed to allow prosecution of bribers of foreign 
officials and officials of designated public international organizations, 
does not include FIFA, but should.6 Though there are other anti-
corruption and anti-fraud statutes that the United States may use to 
prosecute international corruption and bribery, none of these statutes 
can be as effective and efficient as the FCPA because of their 
substantive and jurisdictional limitations.7 
The United States should include FIFA on the list of public 
international organizations under the FCPA’s purview to allow the 
prosecution of foreign corruption affecting arguably the most 
internationally recognized and influential sports organization in the 
world. FIFA is an ideal candidate for inclusion, based on its structure, 
resources, and international involvement. And its inclusion would 
coincide with the goals of the FCPA and its international counterpart, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).8 
In addition, the United States’ inclusion of FIFA under the FCPA could 
encourage other OECD member countries to use the OECD 
Convention’s recommendations as a foundation to discourage 
corruption and include organizations, such as FIFA, under their 
jurisdiction. 
This Comment has three parts. Part I describes FIFA’s internal 
and international organization as the global organizer of soccer9 and 
discusses the development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 as influenced by the OECD Convention.10 Part II argues that the 
 
Bribery Convention. See infra Part I.B.2.  
 5.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (West 2016).  
 6.  22 U.S.C. § 288 (West 2016). A public international organization is an “organization 
in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act 
of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation, 
and which shall have been designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as 
being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in this 
subchapter.” Id. 83 organizations are included under this definition, discussed further in Part 
III.A of this paper. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions could also be applied to other sports 
organizations, such as the International Olympic Committee; however, that is outside the 
scope of this article. 
 7.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 8.  See infra Part III.A. 
 9.  See infra Part I.A. 
 10.  See infra Part I.B. 
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United States is ideally situated to use the FCPA against international 
bribery and corruption.11 And Part III recommends FIFA’s inclusion as 
an ideal public international organization for the purposes of the 
FCPA12 and discusses the impact its inclusion could have on 
encouraging other countries to take similar steps consistent with the 
spirit of the OECD.13 
I.  FIFA, THE FCPA, AND THE OECD CONVENTION 
A.  FIFA’s Structure and International Delegation of 
Governance 
FIFA is a non-governmental organization, similarly structured to 
many modern-day governments, with a “Constitution” that establishes 
independent executive, congressional, and judicial bodies.14 FIFA is 
incorporated in Switzerland15 and governs the world of soccer through 
six individual federations with 211 member associations throughout 
the world.16 Notwithstanding its reach to every corner of the globe, 
legal governance of FIFA remains mostly internal, excepting 
occasional appellate review by the Court of Arbitration of Sport and 
Swiss courts, and the rare prosecution of FIFA officials and business 
partners by other countries’ judicial systems.17 
1.  Internal Organization 
FIFA’s Constitution creates executive, congressional, and 
judicial branches.18 The FIFA Statutes make up the “Constitution” and 
 
 11.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 12.  See infra Part III.A. 
 13.  See infra Part III.B. 
 14.  FIFA STATUTES art. 24–55 (FIFA 2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_n
eutral.pdf. See Governance: How FIFA Works, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-
fifa-works/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). The term “Constitution” refers to the FIFA 
Statutes. FIFA Statutes, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/the-statutes.html 
(last visited May 19, 2016). 
 15.  About FIFA—, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/index.html (last visited Feb. 
29, 2016). 
 16.  Associations, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/associations (last visited May 31, 2016). 
 17.  See, e.g., FIFA Tells Michel Platini He Cannot Go Straight to Court of Arbitration 
for Sport, GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/22/michel-platini-fifa-appeal-court-
arbitration-sport-uefa. 
 18.  The creation of this FIFA “government” is set out in the FIFA Statutes. See generally 
FIFA STATUTES (FIFA 2016). Based on recent reforms, the term “Executive Committee” is 
being phased out in favor of the title “FIFA Council,” though its formation and purpose 
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regulate everything from the voting and election procedures to 
reimbursement for referees and game-day officials.19 According to 
FIFA, “[t]hese documents and the key values of authenticity, integrity, 
performance and unity underpin FIFA’s mission: to develop the game, 
touch the world and build a better future.”20  
Under the FIFA Statutes, the Council and Congress govern most 
of the organization’s operations. The Council consists of thirty-seven 
members, all of whom may hold their positions for up to three four-
year terms, including a President, eight vice-presidents, and twenty-
eight members,21 to include at least one female member from each 
confederation.22 The president, FIFA’s main representative, chairs the 
Congress and Council meetings.23 FIFA’s Congress consists of 211 
member associations from six regional confederations.24 Each member 
association is represented by up to three delegates,25 but has only one 
vote through a single named delegate.26 The Congress has many duties, 
including electing Council members, deciding on the addition of new 
national associations, approving the budget, and controlling FIFA’s 
governing statutes, with the ability to modify, implement, and apply 
the statutes.27  
2.  Delegated Global Governance of Soccer 
As the sole international governing body of soccer, FIFA 
delegates governance to six relatively autonomous regional 
confederations representing every region and recognized soccer club 
in the world. These include the Asian Football Confederation (AFC); 
the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF); the Confederation of 
North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football 
(CONCACAF); the Confederación Sudamericana de Futbol 
(CONMEBOL); the Union of European Football Associations 
 
remains largely the same. Id. art. 75. This comment will use the term “Council” to remain 
consistent with the reforms. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  About FIFA: FIFA Congress, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/fifa-
congress/all-you-need-to-know/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
 21.  FIFA STATUTES art. 33(1)–(4) (FIFA 2016). 
 22.  Id. art. 33(5). In the event that a confederation does not elect at least one female 
member to the Council, that seat will remain unfilled and be deemed forfeited by that 
confederation. Id. 
 23.  Id. art. 35. 
 24.  Associations, supra note 16. 
 25.  FIFA, Standing Orders of the Congress art. 1 (2016). 
 26.  FIFA STATUTES art. 26 (FIFA 2016). 
 27.   Id. at art. 28(2), 29. 
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(UEFA); and the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC).28 Each of 
these confederations has numerous associations, with a maximum of 
one association per country,29 totaling 211 associations within FIFA.30  
FIFA provides financial and logistical support to the associations 
in return for adherence to the statutes and promotion of the sport, as 
well as subjection to the jurisdiction of the FIFA judicial bodies and 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport.31 Lack of adherence to the statutes 
or the decrees of FIFA by a member could lead to financial sanctions 
and potential suspension or expulsion of national football 
associations.32 For example, in Canada’s 2015 Women’s World Cup, a 
group of participants challenged the use of artificial turf as inferior to 
the natural turf used in men’s competitions.33 FIFA allegedly made 
threats of reprisal against the women for challenging a FIFA decree34 
and told its member federations to punish players unless they removed 
their names from the lawsuits.35 To date, there is no evidence that a 
country has ever legally challenged FIFA’s authority to make such 
demands on member federations or players.36 
3. Judicial Processes 
FIFA’s judicial process begins with internal adjudication and then 
appellate jurisdiction through the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
and Swiss courts.37 In addition, countries such as the United States have 
laws that allow prosecution of crimes committed or facilitated within 
their borders.38  
 
 28.  Associations, supra note 16. 
 29.  FIFA STATUTES art. 11(1) (FIFA 2016).  
 30.  Associations, supra note 16. 
 31.  FIFA STATUTES art. 11(4) (FIFA 2016).   
 32.  Id. art. 16–17, 56.  
 33.  Jeff Kassouf, Lawyers: FIFA Threatens Retaliation Against Players Fighting 
Artificial Turf, EQUALIZER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://equalizersoccer.com/2014/10/27/lawyers-
fifa-threatens-retaliation-players-artificial-turf-world-cup-noyola-abily. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Kevin Baxter, FIFA Allegedly Threatened Players Who Supported World Cup 
Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-fifa-
threatened-players-lawsuit-20141028-story.html. 
 36.   The author of this comment conducted a thorough search of past FIFA litigation and 
found no case where a country challenged FIFA’s authority in this manner. See generally 
Roger Pielke, Jr., How Can FIFA Be Held Accountable?, 16 SPORT MGMT. REV. 255, 260–61 
(2012) (discussing the “disincentive for national governments to exercise any supervision of 
FIFA”). 
 37.  FIFA STATUTES art. 52–55, 57–59 (FIFA 2016).   
 38.  Specifically, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Racketeer Influenced 
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a. FIFA’s internal judicial bodies 
FIFA’s judicial bodies include: the Disciplinary Committee, the 
Ethics Committee, and the Appeal Committee.39 Per the FIFA Statutes, 
the judicial bodies are to be comprised of members that “together, have 
the knowledge, abilities and specialist experience that is necessary for 
the due completion of their tasks,” and the chairmen and deputy 
chairmen shall be qualified legal practitioners.40 The Disciplinary 
Committee passes decisions relating to the FIFA Disciplinary Code 
and has the authority to pronounce sanctions on members, subordinate 
clubs, officials, intermediaries, and licensed match agents.41 The Ethics 
Committee, which is governed by the FIFA Code of Ethics, 
pronounces sanctions per the Code of Ethics and the Disciplinary Code 
regarding Code of Ethics violations.42 Lastly, the Appeal Committee 
hears appeals regarding decisions rendered by the Disciplinary and 
Ethics Committees.43 Decisions made by the Appeal Committee are 
considered irrevocable and binding, and are subject only to appeal at 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport.44 
An example of an internal investigation came in December 2015, 
when FIFA’s Ethics Committee investigatory chamber charged FIFA 
President Sepp Blatter and UEFA President Michel Platini with 
“disloyal payment[s]” and conflicts of interest regarding questionable 
transactions.45 As a result, the pair was fined a cumulative $130,000 in 
addition to an eight-year ban on each from “all football-related 
activities.”46 In response to the sentence and the defendants’ appeal to 
FIFA’s Appeal Committee, the Ethics Committee counter-appealed, 
stating that the adjudicatory chamber’s punishment was “too lenient.”47 
After the Appeal Committee  rejected Blatter’s and Platini’s appeals 
and requested reduction of their sentences, both appealed to the Court 
 
and Corrupt Organizations Act. See infra Part II.B. 
 39.  FIFA STATUTES art. 52 (FIFA 2016). 
 40.  Id. art. 52(3). 
 41.  Id. art. 53(1)–(2). 
 42.  Id. art. 54(1)–(2). 
 43.  Id. art. 55(2). 
 44.  Id. art. 55(3). 
 45.  FIFA: Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini Get Eight-Year Bans, BBC SPORT (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/35144652. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Graham Dunbar, FIFA Prosecutors to Appeal for Tougher Blatter, Platini Bans, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 12, 2016), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/109896dc4f7f4224b60b0a1dfc3a77ad/fifa-prosecutors-appeal-
tougher-blatter-platini-bans. 
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of Arbitration for Sport.48 
b.  The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
The CAS is the arbitral body “devoted to resolving disputes 
directly or indirectly related to sport,”49 and is the only court with 
appellate jurisdiction over decisions made by FIFA’s internal 
judiciary.50 The CAS was formed by the International Olympic 
Committee in 1984 and, at that time, only heard general arbitrations.51 
Alterations were made in 1994 that created two arbitration divisions: 
the Ordinary Arbitration Division and Appeals Arbitration Division.52 
The Appeals Arbitration hears disputes arising from decisions taken 
by sports bodies,53 including FIFA. FIFA recognizes the CAS’s 
authority “to resolve disputes between FIFA, member associations, 
confederations, leagues, clubs, players, officials, intermediaries and 
licensed match agents,”54 primarily by applying FIFA regulations and, 
secondarily, Swiss law.55 The cases heard by CAS regarding FIFA, 
however, focus mostly on logistical and managerial matters.56 
c.  Swiss jurisdiction 
FIFA is incorporated in Switzerland, making it subject ultimately 
to Swiss law, though Swiss courts rarely hear matters involving the 
 
 48.  Sepp Blatter Takes FIFA Ban Appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, ESPN FC 
(Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/2831497/sepp-blatter-takes-fifa-
ban-appeal-to-cas. While Blatter’s appeal before the CAS is still pending, CAS rendered a 
decision reducing Platini’s suspension by FIFA to four years. Press Release, Court of 
Arbitration for Sport, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Lowers the Suspension of 
Michel Platini to 4 Years (May 9, 2016), http://www.tas-
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_release_4474_final_eng.pdf. 
 49.  History of the CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-
information/history-of-the-cas.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). The CAS is also located in 
Switzerland. Id. 
 50.  Louise Reilly, Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) & the Role of 
National Courts in International Sports Disputes, A Symposium, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 63, 67 
(2012). 
 51.  History of the CAS, supra note 49. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Code: Statutes of ICAS and CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/icas/code-statutes-of-icas-and-cas.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). The Appeals 
Arbitration Division is responsible for “resolv[ing] disputes concerning the decisions of 
federations, associations or other sports-related bodies,” which includes organizations such as 
the International Association of Athletics Federation and the International Olympic 
Committee. Id. 
 54.  FIFA STATUTES art.  57(1) (FIFA 2016). 
 55.  Id. art. 57(2). 
 56.  Reilly, supra note 50, at 69–70. 
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organization.57 And because FIFA, along with many of the world’s 
sporting organizations, is a non-profit organization based in 
Switzerland,58 it has historically been exempt from Swiss anti-
corruption laws and general financial disclosure rules.59 Beginning in 
2014, Switzerland began discussing laws that would make sport 
organizations’ leaders considered “politically exposed persons,” a title 
usually reserved for politicians and dictators, which would leave them 
open to charges of money laundering and other corruption charges.60 
Those laws were passed in September 2015 after sustained 
international pressure and the May 2015 arrests of numerous FIFA 
officials,61 and they will allow Swiss authorities to investigate 
suspected corruption without receipt of an internal complaint.62 
Because of the recent passage of these laws, their potential impacts are 
so far unknown.63 
 
 57.  Joshua Keating, Switzerland Enabled FIFA’s Corruption for Years. Why It Stopped 
Now, SLATE (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/05/27/fifa_arrests_switzerland_enabled_fifa_s_
corruption_for_years_why_it_stopped.html. 
 58.  For potential reasons as to why Switzerland is an attractive home for these 
organizations, see How Switzerland Champions Champions, SWISSINFO.CH, 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/how-switzerland-champions-champions/8149794, which states, 
“The Swiss law on associations is extremely simple and hugely flexible. Furthermore, the 
slowness of the legislative process offers a lot of legal security.” 
 59.  Keating, supra note 57 (“One Swiss lawmaker calling for reform has noted 
contemptuously that that a multibillion-dollar global organization like FIFA ‘still has the same 
status as a Swiss mountain village yodeling association.’”). See also Helena Bachmann, 
Switzerland Plans to Close Loopholes That Let International Sporting Organizations Be 
Above the Law, TIME (May 27, 2015), http://time.com/3898210/switzerland-fifa-corruption. 
 60.  FIFA and Olympic Leaders Face New Financial Checks, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30451609; Associated Press, New Swiss Law Allows 
More Scrutiny of FIFA and IOC Finances, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/dec/12/swiss-law-fifa-ioc-finances-scrutiny-
sports-governing-bodies. 
 61.  Owen Gibson & Damien Gayle, FIFA Officials Arrested on Corruption Charges as 
World Cup Inquiry Launched, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/27/several-top-fifa-officials-arrested.   
 62.  Joshua Franklin, Swiss Lawmakers Pave Way for ‘Lex FIFA’ Anti-Corruption Law, 
REUTERS (Sep. 11, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-soccer-fifa-swiss-
lawmaking-idUSKCN0RB13720150911.  
 63.  These rules went into effect in April 2016. Michael Shields, Swiss Crack Down on 
Bribery as ‘Lex FIFA’ Set to Take Force, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-corruption-idUSKCN0XH1GE?; Andrew Warshaw, 
Swiss Bring in ‘Lex FIFA’ Laws Giving Power to Prosecute Sports Corruption, INSIDE WORLD 
FOOTBALL (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2016/04/21/swiss-bring-lex-
fifa-laws-giving-power-prosecute-sports-corruption (“[I]t is hoped that tightening the law will 
address gaps that previously made it difficult to prosecute private individuals who either offer 
or accept bribes.”). 
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d.  International jurisdiction 
Foreign prosecution of FIFA and its officials has been rare, 
despite international movements to hold officials and businesses to 
stricter standards in order to reduce corruption.64 However, within the 
last year, the United States has charged forty-one FIFA officials and 
sports marketing officials under its federal laws.65 In May 2015, the 
United States used the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) to arrest FIFA officials and sports 
marketers on charges of racketeering, wire fraud, and money 
laundering.66 In December 2015, sixteen additional individuals were 
arrested on similar charges.67 The United States has not pursued 
charges under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act because FIFA is not 
considered a public international organization under the Act’s 
purview. 68 
B.  The FCPA’s Development Has Been Influenced by the 
OECD Convention 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is a powerful tool 
against international corruption perpetrated or facilitated within U.S. 
borders. The FCPA was enacted as a way to prosecute U.S. businesses 
for corruptly influencing foreign officials, but it has developed in large 
part from an international effort through the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to broadly 
prosecute bribery of any public international organization official or 
its agents.69  
 
 64.  See infra Part I.B (discussing the impact of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on 
international corruption laws and its effects on the FCPA). 
 65.  FIFA Crisis: U.S. Charges 16 More Officials After Earlier Zurich Arrests, BBC 
SPORT (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/34991874. 
 66.  Indictment at 113–19, United States v. Webb, No. 15 C.R. 0252 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 
2015). It is likely that the extraterritorial application of RICO to some FIFA officials without 
direct ties to the United States will be questioned, which may nullify the charges. This 
possibility furthers this article’s argument that the FCPA should be extended to allow 
prosecution of charges relating to FIFA. For a discussion of RICO’s limitations in this context, 
see infra Part II.B.1. 
 67.  Aruna Viswanatha, Joshua Robinson & John Revill, U.S. Indicts 16 New Suspects in 
FIFA Corruption Case, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/authorities-
making-new-fifa-arrests-in-switzerland-1449123950. 
 68.  See infra Part III (arguing that FIFA should be included as a public international 
organization under the FCPA). 
 69.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
BRIBERY ACT OF 1998, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2012/11/14/leghistory.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
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1.  FCPA as a Reaction to International Corruption 
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 to criminalize payments by U.S. 
businesses to foreign government officials in order to obtain or retain 
business.70 The need for this legislation came after more than 400 U.S. 
corporations admitted to paying over $300 million to foreign 
government officials, politicians, and political parties.71 The House of 
Representatives Report stated that legislation was necessary because 
payments made by U.S. businesses “erode[d] public confidence” in the 
free market system and businesses and created foreign policy and 
business issues for the United States.72 The original FCPA referred 
only to payments by U.S. businesses to foreign officials and political 
candidates (or their agents); it made no mention of officials of 
international organizations.73 
2.  FCPA’s Expansion in Light of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention 
In 1988, in addition to making minor amendments to the FCPA,74 
Congress encouraged the Executive Branch to pursue a similar 
international agreement with member countries of the OECD.75 This 
led to the OECD Convention, signed by thirty-three countries in 
December 1997.76 The Convention “establishes legally binding 
 
 70.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494; see also 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act (last visited Feb. 29, 
2016). 
 71.   H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977). The report did not list the organizations but did 
state that they included “some of the largest and most widely held public companies in the 
United States; over 117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries.” Id. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 7. 
 74.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001–
5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415–26. Relevant changes to the FCPA include adding that payments 
must be made to induce action against the foreign official’s “official function” or “in violation 
of his legal duty”; adding prohibited actions to include “procurement of legislative, judicial, 
regulatory, or other action in seeking more favorable treatment”; allowing the defense for 
payments “expressly permitted under any law or regulation” within the foreign official’s 
country; and prohibiting the inclusion of prosecution for violation, or conspiracy to violate, of 
the mail or wire fraud statute. Id. 
 75.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 69. The OECD is “foremost an economic 
organization dedicated to the principles of market economies, economic growth, and world 
trade,” and secondarily a “high-powered research institution” designed as a forum for member 
and non-member government bodies to discuss matters concerning international economic and 
business policies. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 189, 191, 92 
(2005). 
 76.  Id.; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Convention 
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standards to criminalise [sic] bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business transactions,”77 and encourages member 
countries to assert territorial jurisdiction broadly, when possible, so 
that “an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not 
required.”78  
In 1998, Congress made substantial changes to broaden the 
FCPA.79 These amendments expanded the FCPA’s definition of 
foreign official to include an official of a “public international 
organization” that is designated by Executive Order pursuant to the 
International Organizations Immunities Act.80 This inclusion far 
exceeded the recommendations of the Convention, which focused on 
foreign public and government officials.81 In addition to including U.S. 
persons (instead of individuals acting only on behalf of U.S. 
businesses), the amendments expanded the FCPA’s breadth, pursuant 
to the OECD Convention, to include the prosecution of any act “in 
furtherance of the bribe [taken] within the territory of the United 
States.”82 This allowed for the prosecution of bribery of foreign 
officials when any act in “furtherance of the bribery” was conducted 
within the United States.83 
The OECD made additional recommendations to members in 
2009 to further combat corruption.84 These recommendations were 
adopted “to enhance the ability of States Parties to the Anti-Bribery 
 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
Nov. 21, 1997, https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf 
[hereinafter OECD Convention].  
 77.  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter OECD Convention Website].  
 78.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 69. See also OECD Convention, supra note 76, 
art. 4. 
 79.  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302. 
 80.  Id. § 3(c). 
 81.  See generally OECD Convention, supra note 76 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
69. 
 82.  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act § 2. This is pursuant to the 
OECD’s requirement that each party “take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in 
whole or in part in its territory.” OECD Convention, supra note 76, art. 4(1). 
 83.  S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 5 (1998). 
 84.  OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 26, 2009, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf. 
LEEFINALAUTHORREVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  3:47 PM 
294 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:283 
 
Convention to prevent, detect and investigate allegations of foreign 
bribery,”85 and included a list of best practices.86 The best practices 
encourage member countries to review the structure and enforcement 
of their laws implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 
order to most effectively prevent the international bribery of foreign 
public officials.87  
3.  FCPA’s Current Language and Use 
Currently, the United States’ FCPA governs the bribing of 
officials from at least 80 public international organizations,88 in 
addition to providing prosecutorial power over the bribery of any 
foreign governmental official.89 The present language of the FCPA 
reflects its purpose to discourage payment or gifts with the intent to 
illegally influence or disrupt official actions of a foreign government 
or public international organization official.90 Based on the 1998 
amendments, per the OECD Convention, the term foreign official now 
includes “any officer or employee of . . . a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on 
behalf of any such . . . public organization.”91 A public international 
organization is defined as  
(i) an organization that is designated by Executive Order pursuant 
to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 
U.S.C. § 288); or  
(ii) any other international organization that is designated by the 
President by Executive order for the purposes of this section . . . .92 
The designation as a public international organization comes in 
two ways. The typical designation requires (1) the statutory description 
 
 85.  OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/oecdantibriberyrecommendation2009.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 86.  OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Implementing Specific Articles of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Nov. 26, 2009, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Annex I, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See infra Appendix A for a full list of public international organizations designated 
by executive order. 
 89.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (West 2016). 
 90.  Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (West 2016). 
 91.  Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (West 2016). 
 92.  Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(B) (West 2016). 
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as an organization in which the United States participates under a treaty 
or under the authority of a federal statute and (2) an Executive Order.93 
For example, a number of the organizations—such as the United 
Nations, the African Development Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization—are Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) 
established by treaties.94 An organization can also be designated a 
public international organization through presidential designation 
stating that it meets the criteria set forth in the International 
Organization Immunities Act.95 In practice, many of the Executive 
Orders are issued based on the United States’ involvement in the public 
international organization.96 Currently, there are at least 80 
organizations designated by Executive Order under the International 
Organizations Immunities Act falling under the purview of the 
FCPA.97  
II.  THE FCPA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE UNIQUELY SITUATED TO 
HANDLE PROSECUTORIAL POWER OVER CORRUPTION INVOLVING 
FIFA 
Despite potential criticisms, there are a number of reasons why 
the United States government can be particularly effective and 
efficient in combatting international bribery and corruption by using 
the FCPA. 
A.  The United States is Uniquely Situated to Deal with FIFA 
There is ongoing debate over whether or not the United States 
should take on a world policing role;98 however, the United States’ 
unique financial, legal, and social situation allows it to have a large 
 
 93.  22 U.S.C. § 288. 
 94.  Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), HARV. L. SCH., 
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-international-
law/intergovernmental-organizations-igos (last visited May 24, 2016). 
 95.  Weidner v. Int’l Telecommunications Satellite Org., 392 A.2d 508 (1978). 
 96.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13240, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,257 (Dec. 18, 2001) (finding “that 
the Council of Europe in Respect of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) is a 
public international organization in which the United States participates within the meaning 
of the Act.”); Exec. Order No. 9698, 11 Fed. Reg. 1,809 (Feb. 19, 1946) (finding “that the 
United States participates in the [the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International 
Labor Organization, and the United Nations] pursuant to a treaty or under the authority of an 
act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation therefor.”). 
 97.  See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 98.  See, e.g., Shane Croucher, FIFA Corruption Scandal: Maybe Team America Should 
Police the World After All, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/fifa-
corruption-scandal-maybe-team-america-should-police-world-after-all-1504441. 
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impact on the conduct of individuals and businesses likely to bribe 
international organizations. Because of this position, the United States 
has taken on an influential, international leadership role that can 
further the goals of the OECD by adopting a broader definition of 
organizations under the purview of the FCPA. 
The United States has the financial and legal resources to 
successfully prosecute international crimes. The United States 
government has annual revenue of $3.251 trillion99 and spends the third 
highest amount, per capita, on policing and prosecutorial 
expenditures.100 In 2016, the Department of Justice was allotted a 
budget of $28.7 billion.101 With such vast resources and the propensity 
to spend a large amount of money on criminal justice matters, the 
United States is uniquely situated to act as a positive and influential 
leader in matters of international crime and corruption. 
In addition, the United States is socially ideal to prosecute FIFA 
because “America doesn’t like soccer.”102 In the United States, soccer 
is a niche sport that “[doesn’t] capture the imagination of the general 
public, except when national pride is at stake.”103 While this may be a 
sad realization for U.S. soccer fans, it makes the United States an ideal 
candidate to take on FIFA—using RICO, the FCPA, or any other 
available criminal statutes—because the possibility of reprisal or 
retaliation from the organization may not weigh as heavily on the 
United States’ decision. For example, in 2011, when the Belize 
government attempted to hold its national association under the 
scrutiny of its domestic laws, FIFA suspended Belize from 
participating in the World Cup until it complied with FIFA’s demands, 
 
 99.  The World Factbook: Budget, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2056.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2016). 
 100.  GRAHAM FARRELL & KEN CLARK, EUR. INST. FOR CRIME PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
WHAT DOES THE WORLD SPEND ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE? 15 figs.1 & 2 (2004), 
http://www.heuni.fi/material/attachments/heuni/papers/6KtlkZMtL/HEUNI_papers_20.pdf 
(showing that the only countries that spend more per capita on policing are Switzerland and 
Hong Kong; the only countries that spend more per capita on prosecution than the United 
States are Switzerland and Germany). 
 101.  Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2017 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 1, 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/821916/download with Funding, INTERPOL, 
http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Funding (last visited May 25, 2016) (disclosing 
Interpol’s 2015 budget of 79.8 million Euros, or $89.1 million). 
 102.  Stephan Faris, Why America Doesn’t Like Soccer, and How That Can Be Changed, 
TIME (Jun. 12, 2014), http://time.com/2864483/world-cup-2014-soccer-brazil-america. 
 103.  Chris Chase, Americans Don’t Care about the FIFA Scandal, USA TODAY: FOR THE 
WIN (May 29, 2015), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/05/fifa-scandal-americans-usa-wont-care-
sepp-blatter-election. 
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citing “severe government interference.”104 Because of the control over 
players’ and countries’ involvement in some of the most important 
sporting events in the world, there is fear of reprisal or retaliation for 
legally challenging FIFA’s decisions and actions.105 In addition, fans 
and sponsors may be willing to turn a blind eye to inconvenient or 
distasteful requirements by FIFA in order to allow international 
competition to continue.106 However, because of the United States’ 
general apathy toward soccer, and the U.S. government’s overall lack 
of involvement in soccer events, these same fears may not deter the 
United States from legally challenging FIFA.  
B.  The FCPA is the Best Way for the United States to Prosecute 
FIFA’s Corruption 
The United States has numerous anti-corruption and anti-fraud 
laws that govern corruption, but the FCPA is the most effective anti-
corruption law because of jurisdictional advantages as a foreign-
focused statute and its unique international support because of its basis 
in the OECD Convention. 
1.  Other Anti-Corruption and Anti-Fraud Laws Would Not Be 
as Effective Against FIFA 
RICO107 is a strong weapon against corruption, but has certain 
parameters that limit its ability to effectively govern corruption aimed 
at organizations such as FIFA. RICO was added to Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970108 in order to 
combat organized crime and racketeering that was infiltrating 
legitimate organizations at that time.109 Issues have been presented 
regarding the extraterritorial application of the statute because of 
RICO’s recent use against foreign companies. The Supreme Court has 
stated that there is an assumed lack of extraterritorial application when 
extraterritoriality is not explicitly stated within a statute.110 Continued 
 
 104.  FIFA Suspended Belize Football Association, AL JAZEERA (June 18, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/football/2011/06/2011618115332875255.html. 
 105.  Maggie Lin, Caricatures of Critique: Is FIFA Rotten to the Core?, SOCCER POLITICS 
BLOG, http://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/tournament-guides/world-cup-2014/fifa-institutional-
politics/caricatures-of-critique-is-fifa-rotten-to-the-core (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (West 2016). 
 108.  Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. 
 109.  Ann. K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 171 A.L.R. Fed. 1 
Art. 2[a], 4 (2016). 
 110.  Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010); see also Kiobel v. 
LEEFINALAUTHORREVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  3:47 PM 
298 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:283 
 
questions regarding the extraterritorial application of RICO111 make it 
a less-than-ideal tool to combat bribery involving foreign participants, 
such as FIFA.  
The “Travel Act” is also a part of the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, and is a supplemental anti-corruption statute.112 It focuses 
on “interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering 
enterprises,” and criminalizes travel or use of mail services that 
promote illegal activities, such as gambling, distributing illegal 
controlled substances, and human trafficking.113 Because the Travel 
Act is under the same statutory framework as RICO, it faces the same 
issues of extraterritoriality and is therefore not an ideal tool against 
international corruption. 
Mail and wire fraud statutes will face similar limitations. The 
Mail Fraud statute targets the international use of mail services to 
commit a fraud or the receipt of money “by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses.”114 Because it focuses on the use of the U.S. 
Postal Service, it has limited application to charges of international 
corruption of the nature that FIFA, a largely foreign-run entity, would 
be involved in. The Wire Fraud statute similarly focuses on fraud or 
money received via fraudulent means, focusing on the use of wire 
transmission.115 While the statute includes internet activity, it also has 
limitations. Both of these statutes focus on a limited scope of 
fraudulent activity—namely, fraud or receipt of payments—and both 
raise questions about extraterritorial application, similar to the RICO 
Act.  
2.  The FCPA Is the Most Effective and Efficient Anti-
Corruption Law to Use against FIFA 
Unlike other anti-corruption and anti-fraud statutes,116 the FCPA 
has a jurisdictional advantage since it is specifically designed to deal 
with instances of foreign and international corruption. It has none of 
 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (applying the Morrison holding directly 
to the extraterritorial application of RICO). 
 111.  See U.S. § & Exch. Comm’n v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F.Supp.2d 905 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013) (allowing an exception to the Morrison holding based on the specific circumstances 
of the case). 
 112.  18 U.S.C. § 1952 (West 2016). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  18 U.S.C. § 1341 (West 2016). 
 115.  18 U.S.C. § 1343 (West 2016). 
 116.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
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the extraterritorial issues of application, so long as any act in 
furtherance of bribery or corruption takes place within the borders of 
the United States.117 It therefore takes into account the use of the U.S. 
Postal Service, internet and cellular servers, and banks, in addition to 
the physical location of potential parties when the bribery or corrupt 
act(s) takes place.118 
In addition, the United States’ use of the FCPA has large 
international backing because of its basis in the OECD Convention.119 
The OECD Convention set minimum “legally binding” standards for 
all 34 members countries, meaning all of those countries have some 
rendition of a statute similar to the FCPA.120 Broader use of the FCPA 
by the United States may encourage other countries to update and 
extend their current laws to meet the higher standards being set forth, 
using the OECD Convention as a foundational model for combatting 
international bribery and corruption.121 
III.  FIFA SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION CONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS OF THE FCPA AND 
THE OECD CONVENTION 
This section argues that FIFA is an ideal candidate for inclusion 
under the FCPA in direct promotion of its goals and the goals of the 
OECD Convention. In addition, it considers the potential effect of 
FIFA’s inclusion as a public international organization on international 
efforts against corruption and bribery 
A.  Including FIFA as a Public International Organization Is 
Consistent with the FCPA and the OECD Convention 
FIFA has numerous characteristics that make it a prime candidate 
for inclusion on the list of public international organizations consistent 
with the goals and spirit of the FCPA. 
These include its breadth of international membership; its 
considerable size and influence; its status as a non-governmental non-
profit; and its government-like organization.  
 
 117.  S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 5 (1998). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 120.  OECD Convention Website, supra note 77. 
 121.  See infra Part III.B. 
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1.  FIFA’s International Membership Makes It a Highly 
Influential Global Organization 
Membership numbers of currently designated public international 
organization range from two member nations122 to 195 member 
nations.123 These organizations have vast geographic reaches, and the 
majority of the organizations have between 50 and 180 member states. 
FIFA has 209 members,124 with only eight internationally recognized 
countries not represented.125 With representatives acting on behalf of 
each of its members, and local offices and subordinate organizations 
in most member countries, FIFA is ripe for corruption from local and 
international businesses.126 Under the broad application encouraged by 
the OECD Convention,127 the United States should include FIFA under 
the FCPA as an organization that performs substantial business within 
its borders with the ability to impact nearly every country, and many 
territories, throughout the world.  
2.  FIFA’s Size and Influence Are Larger than Most Designated 
“Public International Organizations” 
FIFA’s breadth of international representation and its large 
budget make it one of the largest, most powerful international 
organizations in the world—on par with the United Nations and the 
International Red Cross in terms of membership and finances.128 
 
 122.  These include bilateral organizations, such as the Border Environment Cooperation 
Commission (between the United States and Mexico), the Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
(between the United States and Canada), and the Israel-United States Binational Industrial 
Research and Development Foundation (between the United States and Israel). See, e.g., About 
Us, BORDER ENV’T COOPERATION COMMISSION, http://www.becc.org/about-us (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2016) (describing the Border Environment Cooperation Commission between the 
United States and Mexico); GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION, http://www.glfc.org (last 
visited May 25, 2016); What Is BIRD, BIRD FOUND., 
http://www.birdf.com/?CategoryID=317&ArticleID=374 (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 123.  E.g., List of the 195 Members (and the 10 Associate Members) of UNESCO and the 
Date on Which They Became Members (or Associate Members) of the Organization, U.N. 
EDUC. SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO], http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-
states/countries (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 124.  About FIFA: Who We Are, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-
are/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 125.  Megan Lane & John Walton, Fifa: Six Facts About World Football’s Governing 
Body, BBC NEWS (June 1, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-13616328 (including 
countries such as Vatican City, Kiribati, and Monaco). 
 126.  See infra Part III.A.2–4. 
 127.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 69 (stating that members should “assert territorial 
jurisdiction broadly and, where consistent with national legal and constitutional principles, to 
assert nationality jurisdiction”). 
 128.  See Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present, U.N., 
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According to FIFA’s financial statement, its revenue from 2011 to 
2014 was $5.718 billion, with expenditures of $5.38 billion.129 For 
2013 alone (a year not including the revenue from a FIFA World 
Cup130) FIFA reported $1.386 billion in revenue with $1.314 billion in 
expenditures.131 FIFA’s annual revenue is higher than the revenue 
reported by over 70 countries in the world,132 placing it in a similar 
financial position as the governments of Malawi, the Virgin Islands, 
and Fiji.133 Though the FCPA prohibits the bribing of government 
officials from these countries, it does not account for FIFA as a public 
international organization even though it has a potentially larger 
budget and global influence.134 With such a high volume of 
international currency flowing through the organization, there is no 
question that FIFA is a likely target for the corruption that is at the 
heart of the FCPA and the OECD Convention’s formation. 
3.  FIFA’s Government-Like Organization Makes It Ideal for 
Inclusion Under the FCPA 
FIFA’s hierarchical organizational structure,135 internal judiciary 
methods,136 and geographically decentralized associations137 make it 
similar to many governments whose vulnerability to corruption led to 
the formation of the FCPA.138 The original FCPA was specifically 
designed to deter bribery aimed at influencing government officials 
 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (showing UN 
membership at 193 since 2011); Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Unveils 
$5.4 Billion 2014-2015 Budget to Fifth Committee, Net Reduction of Posts Draws Mixed 
Reviews from Delegates, U.N. Press Release GA/AB/4080 (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gaab4080.doc.htm (stating that the United Nations had a 
proposed budget of $5.4 billion from 2014-2015); Annual Report 2014, INT’L COMMITTEE RED 
CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ICRC-annual-report-2014 (last visited Feb. 20, 
2016) (showing that the International Committee of the Red Cross carried out activities in over 
80 countries and had a $1.38 billion budget in 2014). 
 129.  FIFA, FINANCIAL REPORT 2014, at 14, 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/56/80/39/fr2014webe
n_neutral.pdf. 
 130.  Id. at 16 (showing that the sale of television rights for the FIFA World Cup is FIFA’s 
largest source of income, bringing in an estimated $2.428 billion in 2014 for the World Cup 
in Brazil). 
 131.  Id. at 15. 
 132.  See The World Factbook: Budget, supra note 99. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See supra Part I.A.1. 
 136.  See supra Part I.A.3.a. 
 137.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 138.  See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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acting in their official capacities.139 Because many FIFA officials, such 
as FIFA Executives and Committee officials, are acting in 
government-like authoritative and administrative positions, it is logical 
that the FCPA would target bribes made to them. By including FIFA 
as a public international organization, the FCPA could be applied to 
bribery of FIFA officials congruent with the expectations of the OECD 
Convention and the FCPA by deterring bribery of them as foreign 
officials acting in a public realm with large resources and influence at 
their disposal.  
4.  FIFA’s Status as a Non-Governmental, Non-Profit Does Not 
Bar It from Inclusion as a “Public International 
Organization” 
While the majority of the designated public international 
organizations are commissions, banks, and intergovernmental 
organizations, non-profits can also be included on the list.140 For 
example, the International Fertilizer Development Center is a private, 
non-profit corporation founded in 1976 and was designated a public 
international organization in 1977 by presidential order.141 FIFA’s 
similar non-profit status, therefore, does not prevent it from 
consideration as a public international organization; it may even be a 
more attractive candidate for inclusion because of its large 
membership and expansive global influence. 
5.  Including FIFA as a Public International Organization is 
Consistent with the Spirit of the OECD Convention 
The inclusion of FIFA as a public international organization 
under the FCPA is consistent with the spirit of the OECD’s enactment 
and later amendments. During the original promulgation of the OECD 
Convention, countries were encouraged to “assert territorial 
jurisdiction broadly and, where consistent with national legal and 
constitutional principles, to assert nationality jurisdiction,”142 and the 
Convention still touts itself as “the first and only international anti-
corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the bribery 
transaction.”143 Including organizations not originally in the purview of 
 
 139.  See supra notes 74-77. 
 140.  See infra Appendix A (listing the current public international organizations). 
 141.  History, INT’L FERTILIZER DEV. CENTER, http://ifdc.org/history (last visited Feb. 20, 
2016). 
 142.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 69. 
 143.  OECD Convention Website, supra note 77. 
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the OECD—such as FIFA—is consistent with its encouragement to 
have a broader definition of the type of organization falling under 
statutory enactments.  
It can be inferred from the OECD’s language and tone that it sets 
a minimum standard of criminalization, without mention of a ceiling 
for the standards that member countries may impose individually. A 
number of countries directly follow the OECD Convention’s explicit 
definitions and expectations by limiting public officials and public 
enterprises to those that perform a governmental function or are under 
governmental influence or control.144 However, the United States has 
gone above and beyond in including organizations that are not directly 
related to or under the control of foreign governments.145 Including 
FIFA as a public international organization, either under the 
International Organizations Immunities Act146 or through presidential 
order, would coincide with the spirit of the OECD Convention, which 
included concerns for public policy, protection of business 
transparency, and international promotion of fair trade.147 
C.   Including FIFA May Encourage Other OECD Countries to 
Follow Suit 
By including FIFA as a public international organization under 
the FCPA, the United States may encourage other signatory countries 
of the OECD Convention to expand their laws and take similar steps 
to prevent corruption relating to FIFA and other international sports 
organizations.148 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention currently has 34 
signatory members149 and seven non-OECD members,150 all of whom 
 
 144.  Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 1243, 1261–63 (2008) (discussing Japan, Australia, and France’s adoption of the OECD 
Convention). 
 145.  See infra Appendix A. 
 146.  22 U.S.C. § 288a (West 2016). 
 147.  See generally About, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 148.  Other sports organizations, such as the IOC may be treated similarly under this 
article’s arguments but are outside the scope of the current arguments and recommendations. 
 149.  Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (citing current members Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States). 
 150.  OECD, ABOUT THE 2009 RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/2009_Anti-Bribery_Recommendation_Brief.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (stating 
non-OECD members include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Latvia, Russia, and 
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have embraced the goal of the Convention to discourage corruption. 
By raising the bar above the Convention’s base standard, the United 
States’ inclusion of FIFA under the purview of its domestic statute may 
lead other countries to take a more active role to ensure they are 
following the high standards set by fellow OECD participants. In the 
wake of the United States’ arrests of FIFA and related business 
officials using RICO in May and December of 2015, a number of other 
countries have begun their own investigations against FIFA.151 Having 
an additional tool, such as the FCPA, would allow the United States to 
lead as an example using extraterritorial laws similar to those used by 
OECD Convention countries. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
Including FIFA as a public international organization would 
coincide with the goals and embrace the spirit of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and the OECD Convention to discourage international 
corruption while promoting business and governmental transparency. 
Not only does FIFA fit the mold of an ideal international public 
organization, but allowing the United States to prosecute such a large 
and influential organization would deter corruption and may encourage 
other OECD member countries to take similar steps to combat 
corruption falling within their jurisdictions. At the least, inclusion of 
FIFA as a public international organization under the FCPA would 
trigger broader conversation regarding international corruption and 
may lead to a reconsideration of international corruption laws and their 
ineffectiveness in dealing with large, profitable, and generally 




 151.  Fifa Scandal: Around the World in Football Investigations, BBC NEWS (June 2, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32965432 (discussing investigations in 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). 
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APPENDIX A 
List of Public International Organizations Designated by 
Executive Order152 
African Development Bank, Ex. Ord. No. 12403, Feb. 8, 
1983, 48 F.R. 6087.  
African Development Fund, Ex. Ord. No. 11977, Mar. 14, 
1977, 42 F.R. 14671.  
African Union, Ex. Ord. No. 13377, Apr. 13, 
2005, 70 F.R. 20263.  
Asian Development Bank, Ex. Ord. No. 11334, Mar. 7, 
1967, 32 F.R. 3933.  
Border Environment Cooperation Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 
12904, Mar. 16, 1994, 59 F.R. 13179.  
Caribbean Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 10983, Dec. 30, 
1961, 27 F.R.32.  
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Ex. Ord. No. 
12904, Mar. 16, 1994, 59 F.R. 13179.  
Commission for Labor Cooperation, Ex. Ord. No. 12904, Mar. 
16, 1994, 59 F.R. 13179.  
Commission for the Study of Alternatives to the Panama Canal, 
Ex. Ord. No. 12567, Oct. 2, 1986, 51 F.R. 35495.  
Council of Europe in Respect of the Group of States Against 
Corruption (GRECO), Ex. Ord. No. 13240, Dec. 18, 
2001, 66 F.R. 66257.  
Customs Cooperation Council, Ex. Ord. No. 11596, June 5, 
1971, 36 F.R. 11079.  
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ex. Ord. 
No. 12766, June 18, 1991, 56 F.R. 28463.  
European Space Agency, Ex. Ord. No. 11318, Dec. 5, 
 
 152.  Public International Organizations Covered by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
ICI.ORG, https://www.ici.org/pdf/webinar_11_fcpa_org.pdf. 
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1966, 31 F.R. 15307; Ex. Ord. No. 11351, May 22, 
1967, 32 F.R.7561; Ex. Ord. No. 11760, Jan. 17, 1974, 39 F.R. 2343; 
Ex. Ord. No. 12766, June 18, 1991, 56 F.R. 28463.  
Food and Agriculture Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 9698, Feb. 19, 
1946, 11 F.R. 1809.  
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Ex. Ord. 
No. 13395, Jan. 13, 2006, 71 F.R. 3203.  
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 11059, Oct. 23, 
1962, 27 F.R. 10405.  
Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices, Ex. Ord. No. 13052, 
June 30, 1997, 62 F.R. 35659. 
Inter-American Defense Board, Ex. Ord. No. 10228, Mar. 26, 
1951, 16 F.R. 2676.  
Inter-American Development Bank, Ex. Ord. No. 10873, Apr. 8, 
1960, 25 F.R. 3097; Ex. Ord. No. 11019, Apr. 27, 1962, 27 F.R. 4145.  
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Ex. Ord. No. 
9751, July 11, 1946, 11 F.R. 7713.  
Inter-American Investment Corporation, Ex. Ord. No. 12567, 
Oct. 2, 1986, 51 F.R. 35495.  
Inter-American Statistical Institute, Ex. Ord. No. 9751, July 11, 
1946, 11 F.R. 7713.  
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 11059, 
Oct. 23, 1962, 27 F.R.10405.  
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Ex. Ord. 
No. 10795, Dec. 13, 1958, 23 F.R. 9709. 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Ex. Ord. No. 10727, Aug. 
31, 1957, 22 F.R. 7099.  
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ex. Ord. 
No. 9751, July 11, 1946, 11 F.R. 7713.  
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States 
and Mexico, Ex. Ord. No. 12467, Mar. 2, 1984, 49 F.R. 8229.  
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Ex. 
Ord. No. 11966, Jan. 19, 1977, 42 F.R. 4331.  
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International Civil Aviation Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 9863, 
May 31, 1947, 12 F.R. 3559.  
International Coffee Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 11225, May 22, 
1965, 30 F.R.7093.  
International Committee of the Red Cross, Ex. Ord. No. 12643, 
June 23, 1988, 53 F.R. 24247.  
International Cotton Advisory Committee, Ex. Ord. No. 9911, 
Dec. 19, 1947, 12 F.R. 8719.  
International Cotton Institute, Ex. Ord. No. 11283, May 27, 
1966, 31 F.R. 7667.  
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (limited 
privileges), Ex. Ord. No. 12425, June 16, 1983, 48 F.R. 28069; Ex. 
Ord. No. 12971, Sept. 15, 1995, 60 F.R. 48617; Ex. Ord. No. 13524, 
Dec. 16, 2009, 74 F.R. 67803.  
International Development Association, Ex. Ord. No. 11966, Jan. 
19, 1977, 42F.R. 4331.  
International Development Law Institute, Ex. Ord. No. 12842, 
Mar. 29, 1993, 58 F.R. 17081.  
International Fertilizer Development Center, Ex. Ord. No. 11977, 
Mar. 14, 1977, 42 F.R. 14671.  
International Finance Corporation, Ex. Ord. No. 10680, Oct. 2, 
1956, 21 F.R. 7647.  
International Food Policy Research Institute (limited privileges), 
Ex. Ord. No. 12359, Apr. 22, 1982, 47 F.R. 17791.  
International Fund for Agricultural Development, Ex. Ord. No. 
12732, Oct. 31, 1990, 55 F.R. 46489.  
International Hydrographic Bureau, Ex. Ord. No. 10769, May 29, 
1958, 23 F.R. 3801. 
International Joint Commission—United States and Canada, Ex. 
Ord. No. 9972, June 25, 1948, 13 F.R. 3573. 
International Labor Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 9698, Feb. 19, 
1946, 11 F.R. 1809.  
International Maritime Satellite Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 
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12238, Sept. 12, 1980, 45 F.R. 60877. 
International Monetary Fund, Ex. Ord. No. 9751, July 11, 
1946, 11 F.R. 7713.  
International Pacific Halibut Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 11059, 
Oct. 23, 1962, 27 F.R. 10405. 
International Secretariat for Volunteer Service, Ex. Ord. No. 
11363, July 20, 1967, 32 F.R. 10779.  
International Telecommunication Union, Ex. Ord. No. 9863, May 
31, 1947, 12 F.R. 3559.  
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT), Ex. Ord. No. 11718, May 14, 1973, 38 F.R. 12797; Ex. 
Ord. No. 11966, Jan. 19, 1977, 42F.R. 4331.  
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, Ex. Ord. No. 12986, Jan. 18, 1996, 61F.R. 1693.  
International Wheat Advisory Committee (International Wheat 
Council), Ex. Ord. No. 9823, Jan. 24, 1947,12 F.R. 551. 
Interparliamentary Union, Ex. Ord. No. 13097, Aug. 7, 
1998, 63 F.R. 43065.  
Israel-United States Binational Industrial Research and 
Development Foundation, Ex. Ord. No. 12956, Mar. 13, 
1995, 60 F.R. 14199.  
ITER International Fusion Energy Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 
13451, Nov. 19, 2007, 72 F.R. 65653.  
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, Ex. Ord. 
No. 12997, Apr. 1, 1996, 61 F.R. 14949.  
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Ex. Ord. No. 12647, 
Aug. 2, 1988, 53 F.R. 29323.  
Multinational Force and Observers, Ex. Ord. No. 12359, Apr. 22, 
1982, 47 F.R. 17791.  
North American Development Bank, Ex. Ord. No. 12904, Mar. 
16, 1994, 59 F.R. 13179.  
North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 
12895, Jan. 26, 1994, 59 F.R. 4239.  
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North Pacific Marine Science Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 12894, 
Jan. 26, 1994, 59 F.R. 4237.  
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now known 
as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Ex. 
Ord. No. 10133, June 27, 1950, 15 F.R.4159.  
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ex. Ord. 
No. 13049, June 11, 1997, 62 F.R. 32471. 
Organization of American States (includes Pan American Union), 
Ex. Ord. No. 10533, June 3, 1954, 19 F.R. 3289. 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Ex. Ord. No. 12669, 
Feb. 20, 1989, 54 F.R. 7753.  
Pacific Salmon Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 12567, Oct. 2, 
1986, 51 F.R. 35495. 
Pan American Health Organization (includes Pan American 
Sanitary Bureau), Ex. Ord. No. 10864, Feb. 18, 1960, 25 F.R. 1507.  
Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Ex. Ord. No. 10727, Aug. 31, 1957, 22 F.R. 7099.  
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of 
Migrants from Europe (now known as the Intergovernmental 
Committee for European Migration), Ex. Ord. No. 10335, Mar. 28, 
1952, 17 F.R. 2741.  
South Pacific Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 10086, Nov. 25, 
1949, 14 F.R. 7147.  
United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (BIRPI), Ex. Ord. No. 11484, Sept. 29, 1969, 34 F.R. 15337.  
United Nations, Ex. Ord. No. 9698, Feb. 19, 1946, 11 F.R. 1809.  
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 9863, May 31, 1947, 12 F.R. 3559.  
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Ex. Ord. 
No. 12628, Mar. 8, 1988, 53 F.R. 7725.  
United States-Mexico Border Health Commission, Ex. Ord. No. 
13367, Dec. 21, 2004, 69 F.R. 77605.  
Universal Postal Union, Ex. Ord. No. 10727, Aug. 31, 
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1957, 22 F.R. 7099.  
World Health Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 10025, Dec. 30, 
1948, 13 F.R. 9361.  
World Intellectual Property Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 11866, 
June 18, 1975, 40 F.R. 26015.  
World Meteorological Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 10676, Sept. 1, 
1956, 21 F.R. 6625.  
World Tourism Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 12508, Mar. 22, 
1985, 50 F.R. 11837.  
World Trade Organization, Ex. Ord. No. 13042, Apr. 9, 
1997, 62 F.R. 18017. 
 
